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QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Respondent accepts the petitioners wording of the question
presented, that is:
Does the limited verbal authority given from an owner to a
supplier, limiting the price and source of materials, preclude a
third party supplier, unknown to the owner, from enforcing a
mechanic's lien for the full value of the materials, where the
original supplier exceeds his authority by obtaining the supplies
from the third party supplier?

COURT OF APPEALS OPINION
The cover sheet and full text of the Utah Court of Appeals
Opinion in this case is found in the Appendix hereto and is also
published in 100 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (Jan. 12, 1989).

JURISDICTION
(1)

The Court of Appeals opinion in Case No. 870203-CA was

filed January 12, 1989, and a copy of the opinion was mailed to
counsel for the parties on January 13, 1989.
(2)

Section 78-2-2, Utah Code, confers upon this Court

jurisdiction to review the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals
in this matter.

-1-

CONTROLLING STATUTE
Mechanic's Liens Statute.
Utah Code Section 38-1-3.
Those entitled to lien - What may be attached.
Contractors, subcontractors and all persons performing any
services or furnishing or renting any materials or equipment used
in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any building
or structure or improvement to any premises in any manner and
licensed architects and engineers and artisans who have furnished
designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, estimates
of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who have rendered other
like professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien
upon the property upon or concerning which they have rendered
service, performed labor, or furnished or rented materials or
equipment for the value of the service tendered, labor performed,
or materials or equipment furnished or rented by each
respectively, whether at the instance of the owner or of any
other person acting by his authority as agent, contractor, or
otherwise. This lien shall attach only to such interest as the
owner may have in the property.

-2-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
For purposes of this petition the respondent accepts the
statement of the case as set forth by petitioner.

A more

complete version of the facts and case are set forth in the
respondents1 brief filed with the Court of Appeals which is
attached hereto as Addendum 2.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE QUESTION PRESENTED HAS BEEN RULED ON BY THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION IS
CONSISTENT WITH THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
Petitioner apparently seeks a grant of certiorari under
subpart 4 of Rule 40 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedures
based on the belief that this case involves an important question
of State Law which has not been but should be settled by the
Supreme Court.
The principle question; that is, whether an owner and his
agent/contractor can restrict by an agreement of their own the
rights of a third party supplier to file a mechanic's lien, has
been fully addressed by this court.

The case of Interior's

Contracting, Inc. v Navalco, 648 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1982) has
answered that question for cases involving written limitations on
authority.

The Supreme Court held such a written restriction

could not preclude the statutory protections of the mechanic's
lien statute for either the agent or those claiming through him.

-3-

The Court of Appeals has applied that ruling to this case in
which there is a claim of verbal limitation on the authority of
the agent/contractor.

The Court of Appeals correctly reasoned

that if, as held in Navalco, supra, a written limitation does not
per se prohibit lien claims, then certainly the verbal agreement
could not limit a third party's lien rights.

The decision by the

Court of Appeals is an obvious extensive of the law of Navalcof
supra, and does not require further elucidation by the Supreme
Court,
II.
THE PETITIONER DOES NOT SEEK REVERSAL TO THE
COURT OF APPEALS BUT RATHER DEMANDS REVIEW ON CLAIMS
NOT PRESENTED AT TRIAL
In their brief, petitioner does not now seek to overturn the
Court of Appeals rule of law as stated above in favor of the
decision of the trial court.
on a new basis

not

Rather, petitioner seeks a reversal

raised

before

the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner now claims that under all the facts and circumstances
surrounding the owner's grant of authority to the contractor that
there was not agency and that this lien must fail.
Such a review by the Supreme Court is not appropriate under
Rule 40 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and is not necessary.
The Court of Appeals, has already applied the law to the facts of
this case.

(See opinion at pages 3 and 4 of the decision.)

The

Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court's decision and has held
that:

(1), the petitioner did authorize the contractor to

perform the work;

(2), for his benefit; and
-4-

(3), that the

respondent dealt with this contractor without knowledge of any
limitation on this authority; and

(4), wasf therefore, entitled

to the protections of the lien law.

CONCLUSION
Certiorari should not be granted.

The Court of Appeals

decision is consistent with well established law of the Utah
Supreme Court.

Petitioner does not seek a change of the law of

the casef but only seeks further review of the facts of the case
on issues not raised to the Court of Appeals.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this *£~

day of March, 1989.

^ W ^ fifa/* i
STEVEN F. ALDER
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify

that a true and correct copy of the

foregoing document was mailed to John W. Call, Attorney for
William G. Call and Gene S. Call, 320 South 500 East, Salt Lake
City, Utah

84102, on this JkdL-A&l

of March, 1989.

/(j//uL<, ffitfZ/ti'.
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ADDENDUM
1.

Opinion of the Court of Appeals 2

2,

Brief of Appellant to the Court of Appeals

COVER SHEET
CASE TITLE:
Claron D. Bailey,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
William G. Call and
Gene S, Call,
Defendants and Respondents.

870203-CA

PARTIES:
Steven F. Alder (Argued)
Attorney for Appellant
220 East 3900 South, Suite 16
Salt Lake City, UT
84107
John W. Call (Argued)
Attorney for Respondents
320 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, UT
84102
TRIAL JUDGE:
Hon. Michael J. Hutchings
Salt Lake City
Fifth Circuit Court
451 So. 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
December 12, 1989
OPINION
This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted, and the
Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is now
ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the circuit
court herein be, and the same is, reversed and remanded for
further proceedings in accordance with the views expressed in
the opinion filed herein.
Opinion of the Court by JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Judge; NORMAN H.
JACKSON, Judge concurs. GREGORY K. ORME, Judge concurring
specially.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 13th day of January, 1989, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing OPINION was mailed or personally
delivered to each of the above parties.

(rase Manager
TRIAL COURT:
Salt Lake City
Fifth Circuit Court
Case No. 85-CV-10254
ADDENDUM 1

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOoo
Claron D. Bailey,
OPINION
(For Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellant,
v*

Case No. 870203-CA
William G. Call and Gene S. Call,

FILED

Defendants and Respondents*
Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Orme.

*|AW191QQQ

%iakmLm^==^
BILLINGS,

Judge:

V

MaryT Noonan
Clerk of the Court

Utah Court of Appeals

Appellant Claron Bailey ("Bailey") appeals the trial
court*s refusal to enforce his mechanics lien against real
property owned by respondents William and Gene Call ("Call").
Bailey also challenges the trial court's award of only $1,800
in damages pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 14-2-1 and -2
(1986),* for Call's failure to obtain a bond. Finally,
Bailey challenges the court's refusal to award him attorney
fees. We reverse and remand.
FACTS
In April 1985, Call was repairing the roof of his carpet
and furniture store. A customer, Mr. Leroy Gurule ("Gurule"),
claimed he could supply the ceiling tiles, grids and other
materials required for repairs at a very low cost. Call and
Gurule entered into an agreement whereby Gurule would supply
the materials. Call claims he understood the materials were to
be supplied from Gurulecs stock, or brought in by bulk delivery
to save Call money.
1. Utah Code Ann. §§ 14-2-1, -2 (1986), were repealed in 1987.
However, the changes are not relevant to our decision as we
decide the case on an alternative basis.

Instead, Gurule ordered the materials on open account from
Bailey. All invoices stated the materials were for
"Mastercraft Warehouse/" Call's carpet and furniture store/ and
that is where the materials were delivered. Call claims he
personally was not aware the materials were purchased from
Bailey until the job was completed and Call had partially paid
Gurule. However, an employee of Call testified he knew the
materials were coming from Bailey. The trial court found the
reasonable value of the materials sold to Gurule and installed
as improvements to Call's real property was $3/327.90.
When Bailey did not receive payment for the materials/ he
filed a valid mechanic's lien pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 38-1-3 (1986)/ and subsequently brought this action to
foreclose the lien or, alternatively, impose liability on Call
pursuant to the bond provision of Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-1
(1986). The trial court held that Gurule# as Call's agent, had
no authority to order the materials from Bailey and thus Bailey
could not foreclose his mechanic's lien. However/ the trial
court entered judgment for $1#800 together with costs and
interest against Call since Call had not required Gurule to
provide a bond to protect materialmen/ as required under Utah
Code Ann. § 14-2-1 (1986).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for findings of fact entered by a
trial court in a non-jury proceeding is set forth in Utah R.
Civ. P. 52(a), which provides, in pertinent part:
Findings of fact/ whether based on oral or
documentary evidence/ shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity
of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses.
However, we review a trial court's conclusions of law under
a correction of error standard. Stewart v. Coffman, 748 P.2d
579/ 580-81 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)(quoting Scharf v. BMG Corp.,
700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985)).
MECHANICS' LIENS
The trial court found Call and Gurule had agreed that all
materials would be provided from Gurule9s inventory. Based on
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this finding, the court concluded that Gurule was acting in
excess of his authority when he purchased materials from
Bailey, precluding foreclosure of Bailey's mechanic's lien. On
appeal, Bailey contends neither the facts nor the law support
such a limitation on Gurule's authority. We agree.
The controlling statutory provision provides, with our
emphasis:
Contractors, subcontractors, and all
persons performing any services or
furnishing or renting any materials or
equipment used in the construction,
alteration, or improvement of any premises
in any manner . . . shall have a lien
upon the property upon or concerning which
they have rendered service, performed
labor, or furnished or rented materials or
equipment for the value of the service
rendered, labor performed, or materials or
equipment furnished or rented by each

respectively, whether at the instance of
the owner <?r of any other person acting by
his authority as agent« contractori or
otherwiset
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3 (1986). The issue is whether Bailey
provided materials "at the instance of the owner (Call) or of
any other person acting by his authority as agent, contractor
or otherwise."
The mechanics' lien statute "is intended and designed to
prevent the owner of land from taking the benefits of
improvements placed on his property without paying for the
labor and material that went into them." Frehner v. Morton. 18
Utah 2d 422, 424 P.2d 446, 447 (1967). The statute is to
protect laborers and materialmen who enhance the value of the
property, and to effectuate that purpose, we construe the
statute broadly. Interiors Contracting Inc. v. Navalco. 648
P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah 1982).
The Utah Supreme Court, discussing an agent's authority to
bind the owner/principal under the mechanics' lien statute, has
stated "the facts of the transaction must be explored. . . .
[T]he courts have often gone beyond the agreement and into the
whole circumstances,... in order to find the answer."

870203-CA
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Interiors Contracting Inc. 648 P.2d at 1387 (quoting Utlev v.
Wear, 323 S.W.2d 787, 792-93 (Mo. App. I960)). In making this
evaluation, "[s]o long as it can be found that the [contractor]
performed the work at the instance of [the owner] under an
express or implied contract . . . the lien is valid." Duoaer
v. Cox, 564 P.2d 300, 302 (Utah 1977). If it appears the
improvements are for the benefit of the owner, and performed at
the instance of the owner1s agent, "then it can be said with
justice that the [contractor] in such case is acting for the
[owner].- Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Carlson, 23 Utah 2d 395,
464 P.2d 387, 390 (1970).
In Interiors Contracting Inc., the Utah Supreme Court
addressed the liability of a lessor for contracts made by a
lessee for improvements to the lessor's real property. 648
P.2d at 1386-87. The written lease between the lessor and
lessee expressly required all improvements to be made at the
lessee's expense and required the lessee to promptly pay all
contractors and materialmen. The issue, as in this case, was
whether the limitation on the lessee's agency precluded lien
liability on the lessor's/owner's fee interest. The Court
found this express limitation of authority in the lease
agreement "cannot override the effect of the mechanics' lien
law as to persons not a party to the lease." !£• Thus, the
limited agency between the owner and the agent was not the
decisive factor. Rather, the Court focused on the benefits
conferred upon the owner. id. Accord Metals Mfg. Co. v. Bank
of Commerce, 16 Utah 2d 74, 395 P.2d 914, 915 (1964) ("[I]t
would seem to be unrealistic and unreasonable to conclude that
such parties by agreement among themselves, could bind third
party suppliers of materials to the terms of an agreement to
which such suppliers were not privies and the terms of which
they do not know.").
Other jurisdictions which have considered this issue have
held that the owner consent required by a mechanics' lien
statute is merely authority to commence work on improvements.
Once the owner gives authority to his contractor agent to begin
work, secret limitations as to the price or nature of the work
are an ineffective defense against a mechanic's lien. For
example, in Vickerv v. Richardson, 189 Mass. 53, 75 N.E. 136
(Mass. 1905), the Massachusetts Supreme Court analyzed an
owner's defense to a mechanic's lien. The architect had been
given express limitations on the amount of money he was
authorized to spend for improvements. Contrary to these
express limitations, the architect engaged a contractor to
build for an amount in excess of the authorized limit. The
court upheld the contractor's lien on the owner's property,
stating:

870203-CA
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[I]t is claimed that this implied
authority, although it empowered [the
architect] to make . . . contracts/ did
not confer any authority to bind the
[owner] to pay an increased price, as [the
architect] was limited to the amount
specified in the contract with [the
o w n e r ] . . . . The consent given, however,
is to the performance of the work, not to
the lien, or the amount for which, under

i t , the interest of the owner in the lanfl
cgn be cfrgrgeflt
Id. at 136 (emphasis added).
With these principles in mind, we review the trial court's
refusal to foreclose Bailey's mechanic's lien. It is
undisputed that Bailey was unaware of any agreement between
Call and Gurule limiting Gurule's authority to purchase
materials. Accordingly, under the precedent previously
discussed, even if the evidence supports the trial court's
finding that Gurule was to supply the materials from his own
inventory, this limitation does not preclude foreclosure of
Bailey's mechanic's lien.
If, as in Interiors Contracting Inc., an express limitation
in a lease cannot protect a lessor/owner from lien liability,
it necessarily follows that a verbal understanding cannot limit
the lien liability of an owner against a materialman who, in
good faith, supplied products to the contractor to benefit the
owner's property.
The trial court's legal conclusion that Gurule could not
bind Call as owner of the property is in error. Gurule was an
agent authorized to furnish materials to improve Call's
property, under the mechanics' lien statute. Gurule purchased
$3,327.90 in materials from Bailey which directly benefited
Call's property, and Bailey was not paid for these materials.
Bailey properly filed a mechanic's lien and is entitled to its
foreclosure. Call could not limit Gurule's authority to the
detriment of Bailey, a third party supplier not privy to
Gurule's and Call's original conversation. Call's consent and
authorization under,the mechanics' lien statute went to the
performance of the work, not to the source of the materials•

870203-CA
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We reverse the trial court and award Bailey $3,327.90 under
his mechanic's lien claim.2
ATTORNEY FEES
The second issue on appeal is the trial court's denial of
Bailey's claim for attorney fees. Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18
(1988) provides:
In any action brought to enforce any lien
under this chapter the successful party
shall be entitled to recover a reasonable
attorneys' fee# to be fixed by the court/
which shall be taxed as costs in the
action.
Because of our decision allowing Bailey to foreclose his
mechanic's lien# we hold he is entitled to a reasonable
attorney fee. Accordingly/ we reverse and remand for the
determination of a reasonable attorney fee under § 38-1-18.
Reversed and remanded.

Judith M. Billings/ Judge
I CONCUR:

Norman H. Jackson^Judge
ORME, J. (concurring specially):
I agree with what is said in the main opinion about the
applicability of the mechanics' lien statute and Bailey's right
to foreclose his lien. I am troubled by the result/ however, in
that the adjudged amount of Bailey's lien# $3/327.90/ greatly
exceeds the amount Call agreed to pay Gurule for the
2. Based upon our conclusion that Bailey's mechanic's lien can
be foreclosed against Call/ it is unnecessary to reach the
issues Bailey raises under the bond statute.

870203-CA
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materials.1 As Call had a deal to procure those materials
for much less, it strikes me as unfair to impose this full
amount on Call. Call had no knowledge of Bailey and no control
over him. Indeed# Callus contract with Gurule specifically
required Gurule to supply the materials himself, on favorable
terms. Nor do I see how Call could have done anything to
protect himself—short of calling all construction material
suppliers in the West and advising them of the fact Gurule had
no authority to purchase materials from them for use in Call's
project. As a matter of fairness, I think Bailey's lien should
be limited, aside from recoverable fees and costs, to the
amount Call contracted to pay for the materials.
Indeed, a number of reported cases have held that the
amount of a subcontractor's or supplier's lien is limited by
the amount owed on the contract between the owner and
contractor. £g£, etqt, WestinqhPMSe EleCt SUPPLY COti InQf v,
Electromech. Inc., 119 N.H. 833, 409 A.2d 1141, 1143 (1979);
Cashwav Lumber Co. v. Lanaston, 479 P.2d 582, 586 (Okla.
1970). "This limitation is demanded as a matter of simple
justice and expediency. The owner, having direct relation with
the contractor, knows what his liablity to him is. Having no
such relation with the subcontractor, he does not know what the
contractor's liability to the subcontractor is." Westinqhouse
Electric, 409 A.2d at 1143 (quoting Boulia-Gorell Lumber v.
East Coast Pealty CQ,, 84 N.H. 174, 148 A. 28, 31 (1929)).
"The purpose of limiting a subcontractor's lien, therefore, is
to protect the owner from unknown liability to the
subcontractor or materialman and from liability for payments in
excess of the amounts owed to the general contractor." 409
A.2d at 1144.
However, it must be conceded that these cases turn on
particular statutory provisions. Likewise, an old Utah case is
consistent with the notion that a supplier's or subcontractor's
lien may not exceed the amount the property owner contracted to
pay. See Sierra Nevada Lumber Co. v. Whitmore, 24 Utah 130, 66
P. 779, 781 (1901) ("subcontractor, by virtue of the original
contract, is entitled, under his subcontract, to a lien, within
the limit of the original contract price"). But Sierra also
turned, in relevant part, on a statutory provision which
appears to have been deleted at some point from the Utah Code
and is not in the present version of our mechanics' lien
1. That amount was $2,600 according to Call's uncontroverted
testimony. The findings prepared by Bailey's counsel
mistakenly recite a figure of $1,800.

870203-CA
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statute.2

See Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-1 to -26 (1988).

Unfortunately, in my view, the statutory scheme currently
in effect in Utah does not protect a property owner from
potentially paying more to a subcontractor or supplier than he
agreed to pay to his contractor. On the contrary, the property
owner is only protected to the extent that he cannot be liened
for more than the "value" of the materials. Utah Code Ann. §
38-1-3 (1988). Such protection is no doubt sufficient in the
routine case, but it is inadequate in a case like this one,
where a property owner contracts for materials at greatly
discounted prices and ends up being liable for the full value
of those materials ^through no fault of his own.

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

2. The provision, Rev. Stat. § 1373, provided in part as
follows: "In case of a contract between an owner and a
contractor, the lien shall extend to the entire price, and such
contract shall operate as a lien in favor of all persons except
the contractor to the extent of the whole contract price . . . ,
Sierra, 66 P. at 781.

870203-CA
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following question is presented for review:
1.

Does the limited verbal authority given from an

owner to a supplier, limiting the price and source of materials,
preclude a third party supplier, unknown to the owner, from
enforcing a mechanic's lien for the full value of the materials,
where the original supplier exceeds his authority by obtaining the
supplies from the third party supplier?
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION
The cover sheet and full text of the Utah Court of
Appeals Opinion in this case is found in the Appendix hereto and
is also published in 100 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (Jan. 12, 1989).
JURISDICTION
(1)

The Court of Appeals opinion in Case No. 370203-CA

was filed January 12, 1989, and a copy of the opinion was mailed
to counsel for the parties on January 13, 1989.
(2)

Section 78-2-2, Utah Code, confers upon this Court

jurisdiction to review the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals
in this matter.

1

CONTROLLING STATUTES
1.

Mechanic's Liens Statutes.
Utah Code Section 38-1-3.

Those entitled to lien - What may be attached.
Contractors, suocontractors and all persons performing
any services or furnishing or renting any materials or equipment
used in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any
building or structure or improvement to any premises in any
manner and licensed architects and engineers and artisans who have
furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings,
estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who have
rendered other like professional service, or bestowed labor, shall
have a lien upon the property upon or concerning which they have
rendered service, performed labor, or furnished or rented
materials or equipment for the value of the service tendered,
labor performed, or materials or equipment furnished or rented by
each respectively, whether at the instance of the owner or of any
other person acting by his authority as agent, contractor, or
otherwise. This lien shall attach only to such interest as the
owner may have in the property.
2.

Bond Law Statutes.

Utah Code Section 14-2-2 (former statute, prior to 1987
revis ion). Failure to require bond — Direct Liability —
Limitation of actions.:
Any person subject to the provisions of this chapter, who
shall fail to obtain such good and sufficient bond, or to exhibit
the same, as herein required, shall be personally liable to all
persons who have furnished materials or performed labor under the
contract for the reasonable value of such materials furnished or
labor performed, not exceeding, however, in any case the prices
agreed upon. Actions to recover on such liability shall be
commenced within one year from the last date the last materials
were furnished or the labor performed.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Claron Bailey brought this action in Salt Lake Fifth
Circuit Court to foreclose a mechanic's lien he had filed against
property owned by William G. Call and Gene S. Call.

Bailey had

supplied material used in the repair of Call's commercial
building.

Mr. Call had contracted with LeRoy Gurule to supply the

material from Gurule's own warehouse.

Thereafter, Gurule, without

Call's knowledge, ootained the materials from Bailey.
Following trial in Circuit Court, the trial court denied
Bailey recovery under the mechanic's lien statute, citing the
specific limitation of authority given Gurule (Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, found at Record 36 7, specifically paragraph
2 of the Conclusions of Law, at R.373).

Instead, the trial court

awarded Bailey judgment pursuant to the bond statute and limited
Bailey's recovery to the price agreed upon between Call and Bailey
(R. 373-374).
Bailey appealed the trial court's decision and the Court
of Appeals reversed, holding that "Call's consent and
authorization under the mechanic's lien statute went to the
performance of the work, not to the source of the materials", 100
Utah Adv. Rep 11, at 12

(see also the Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law, p. 5, in the Appendix).
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Statement of the Facts
In April 1985, Mr. Call had a conversation with a
customer in his store who noticed ceiling repairs were necessary
in the building.

The customer, LeRoy Gurule, represented that he

bought materials by the truckload direct from manufacturers and
could supply materials at a favorable price.

Accordingly, Gurule

was commissioned to supply the material from his own warehouses
(R. 348-351).
Unbeknownst to Call, Gurule contacted Claron Bailey, also
a supplier of the necessary material, to arrange delivery of the
needed material to Call's building (R. 352, 224-225).

The trial

court found that Call was not aware of the source of the material
until after the last delivery (R. 371-372, paragraph 23, 24 and
25).
ARGUMENT
This Court has not had an opportunity to address the
specific scope of language found in Section 33-1-3, in the factual
context presented by this case, specifically the authority of an
agent to act in behalf of the owner.

The trial judge found that

the limitation present in the agreement between Call and Gurule,
i.e. that Gurule would supply the material from his own stock,
precluded Bailey from recovering under the mechanic's lien statute
because Gurule acted without authority.

However, Section 38-1-3

contains no such limitations on the scope of the authority of a
person or agent acting on behalf of the owner.

4

The Court of

Appeals' decision suggest that a supplier need not verify the
authority of an agent before supplying material in order to
recover the full value of the materials under the mechanic lien
statute.
The Utah Appeals Court misreads the effect of this
Court's holding in Interior's Contractingy Inc. v. Navalco, 648
P.2d 1382 (Utah 1982).

The Appeals Court focused only on language

in that opinion that dealt with the rights and liabilites of
sub-lessors and sub-lessees.

The Appeals Court, however, ignored

the holding in which reversed a judgment awarded against the owner
of the building, citing a lack: of evidence that the owner had
authorized the specific work to be done.

Indeed, this Court

stated:
Navalco's [the owner] knowledge and acquiescence
in the making of the improvements is not sufficient
to charge the fee owner's interest with a mechanic
lien, see Zions First National Bank v. Carlson,
23 Utah 2d 395, 464 P.2d 387 (1970), especially
since Navalco was a remote lessor and the master
lease between Navalco and Green Acres [lessee/
sublessor] did not contemplate that the premises
were to be used as a restaurant. 648 P.2d 1382 at 1390.
Thus this Court has upheld the principle applied by the
trial court that an owner is not always liable for the value of
work or materials under the mechanic's lien statute particularly
where the owner has not given specific authority for specific
work, or as in this case, materials.
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This reasoning is directly contrary to the Court of
Appeals reasoning in its opinion and the case cited by the Court
of Appeals in support of this opinion, Vickery v. Richardson, 189
Mass. 53, 75 M.E. 136 (1905).

Other cases cited by the Court

of Appeals actually support the trial court's judgment.

In

Frehner v. Morton, 18 Utah 2d 422, 424 P.2d 446 (1967), the facts
show that the owner was properly charged with liability under the
mechanic's lien statute because he knew and gave authority to his
daughter to engage the services of the plaintiff architect.

In

fact, this Court cited the owner's authorization of the work and
the person who did the work as controlling in its decision.

424

P.2d, at 447.
In Metals Mfg. Co. v. Bank of Commerce, 16 Utah 2d 74,
395 P.2d 914 (1954), this Court held that the occupier of the
subject building, the lessee bank, knew in advance the contractor
had obtained specific materials from a supplier.

This Court

therefore held that the intention and the knowledge of the parties
properly resulted in a valid bond claim against the bank.
The grounds for reversing the trial court cited by the
Appeals Court are directly contrary to rulings by this court
dealing with general principles of agency law.

In a commercial

code case involving banks, Zions First National Bank v.
Clark Clinic Corp, 762 P.2d 1090 (Utah 1988), this court has
noted:
6

....It is well established that the mere fact
that an employee has managerial status and is
in charge of a company's office does not
entitle third persons to assume that he had
the authority to execute or endorse negotiable
paper belonging to his employer. 762 P.2d 1090
at 1095 (quoting Confederate Welding v. Bank
of Mid-South, 453 So. 2d 1370, at 1375 (La. App.
1984).
The Court of Appeals, in an attempt to protect
materialmen and sub-contractors at all costs, has ignored the
language of the mechanic's lien statute by superimposing its
notion of what Call's agreement with Gurule should have meant,
instead of simply applying the facts to the law.
CONCLUSION
It is evident that in the other cases before this Court,
where bond or lien claimants have been successful, this Court has
always approved or disapproved those claims by looking

at all the

facts and circumstances surrounding an owner's authority given to
a contractor or supplier.

That authority has never been limited

by any decision of this Court.

The ruling by the Utah Court of

Appeals herein is thus in conflict with lien and agency
principles enunciated by this Court in other cases.

Thus, the

decision of the Court of Appeals in this case is in conflict with
this Court or at the very least is in an area of law that should
be resolved clearly and distinctly by this Court.
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DATED this

of February, 1989.

JOHN W. CALL
A
Attorney for Defendants
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
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OPINION
This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted, and the
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BILLINGS, Judge:

Appellant Claron Bailey (-Bailey-) appeals the trial
court's refusal to enforce his mechanic*s lien against real
property owned by respondents William and Gene Call ("Call").
Bailey also challenges the trial courtfs award of only $1,800
in damages pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 14-2-1 and -2
(1986),* for Call's failure to obtain a bond. Finally,
Bailey challenges the court's refusal to award him attorney
fees. We reverse and remand.
FACTS
In April 1985, Call was repairing the roof of his carpet
and furniture store. A customer, Mr. Leroy Gurule ("Gurule"),
claimed he could supply the ceiling tiles, grids and other
materials required for repairs at a very low cost. Call and
Gurule entered into an agreement whereby Gurule would supply
the materials. Call claims he understood the materials were to
be supplied from Gurule*s stock, or brought in by bulk delivery
to save Call money.
1. Utah Code Ann. §§ 14-2-1, -2 (1986), were repealed in 1987,
However, the changes are not relevant to our decision as we
decide the case on an alternative basis.

Instead/ Gurule ordered the materials on open account from
Bailey. All invoices stated the materials were for
"Mastercraft Warehouse/H Call's carpet and furniture store, and
that is where the materials were delivered. Call claims he
personally was not aware the materials were purchased from
Bailey until the job was completed and Call had partially paid
Gurule. However# an employee of Call testified he knew the
materials were coming from Bailey. The trial court found the
reasonable value of the materials sold to Gurule and installed
as improvements to Callus real property was $3/327.90.
When Bailey did not receive payment for the materials, he
filed a valid mechanicfs lien pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 38-1-3 (1986)/ and subsequently brought this action to
foreclose the lien or, alternatively, impose liability on Call
pursuant to the bond provision of Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-1
(1986). The trial court held that Gurule/ as Call's agent/ had
no authority to order the materials from Bailey and thus Bailey
could not foreclose his mechanic's lien. However, the trial
court entered judgment for $1/800 together with costs and
interest against Call since Call had not required Gurule to
provide a bond to protect materialmen/ as required under Utah
Code Ann. § 14-2-1 (1986).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for findings of fact entered by a
trial court in a non-jury proceeding is set forth in Utah R.
Civ. P. 52(a)/ which provides, in pertinent part:
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity
of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses.
However# we review a trial court's conclusions of law under
a correction of error standard. Stewart v. Coffman, 748 P.2d
579/ 580-81 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)(quoting Scharf v. BMG Corp.,
700 P.2d 1068/ 1070 (Utah 1985)).
MECHANICS' LIENS
The trial court found Call and Gurule had agreed that all
materials would be provided from Gurule's inventory. Based on
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this finding, the court concluded that Gurule was acting in
excess of his authority when he purchased materials from
Bailey, precluding foreclosure of Bailey's mechanic's lien. On
appeal, Bailey contends neither the facts nor the law support
such a limitation on Gurule#s authority. We agree.
The controlling statutory provision provides, with our
emphasis:
Contractors, subcontractors, and all
persons performing any services or
furnishing or renting any materials or
equipment used in the construction,
alteration, or improvement of any premises
in any manner . . . shall have a lien
upon the property upon or concerning which
they have rendered service, performed
labor, or furnished or rented materials or
equipment for the value of the service
rendered, labor performed, or materials or
equipment furnished or rented by each

respectively, whether at the instance of
the owner or of any other person acting bv
his authority as agent, contractor, or
Otherwiset
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3 (1986). The issue is whether Bailey
provided materials "at the instance of the owner (Call) or of
any other person acting by his authority as agent, contractor
or otherwise."
The mechanics' lien statute "is intended and designed to
prevent the owner of land from taking the benefits of
improvements placed on his property without paying for the
labor and material that went into them." Frehner v. Morton. 18
Utah 2d 422, 424 P.2d 446, 447 (1967). The statute is to
protect laborers and materialmen who enhance the value of the
property, and to effectuate that purpose, we construe the
statute broadly. Interiors Contracting Inc. v. Navalco, 648
P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah 1982).
The Utah Supreme Court, discussing an agent*s authority to
bind the owner/principal under the mechanics1 lien statute, has
stated "the facts of the transaction must be explored. . . .
[T]he courts have often gone beyond the agreement and into the
whole circumstances.... in order to find the answer."
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Interiors Contracting Inc., 648 P.2d at 1387 (quoting Utley v.
Wear, 323 S.W.2d 787, 792-93 (Mo. App. I960)). In making this
evaluation, "[s]o long as it can be found that the [contractor]
performed the work at the instance of. [the owner] under an
express or implied contract . . . the lien is valid." Duaaer
v. Cox, 564 P.2d 300, 302 (Utah 1977). If it appears the
improvements are for the benefit of the owner, and performed at
the instance of the owner1s agent, "then it can be said with
justice that the [contractor] in such case is acting for the
[owner]." Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Carlson, 23 Utah 2d 395,
464 P.2d 387, 390 (1970).
In Interiors Contracting Inc., the Utah Supreme Court
addressed the liability of a lessor for contracts made by a
lessee for improvements to the lessor's real property. 648
P.2d at 1386-87. The written lease between the lessor and
lessee expressly required all improvements to be made at the
lessee*s expense and required the lessee to promptly pay all
contractors and materialmen. The issue, as in this case, was
whether the limitation on the lessee"s agency precluded lien
liability on the lessor*s/owner*s fee interest. The Court
found this express limitation of authority in the lease
agreement "cannot override the effect of the mechanics* lien
law as to persons not a party to the lease." 111. Thus, the
limited agency between the owner and the agent was not the
decisive factor. Rather, the Court focused on the benefits
conferred upon the owner. IcJ. Accord Metals Mfg. Co. v. Bank
of Commerce, 16 Utah 2d 74, 395 P.2d 914, 915 (1964) ("[I]t
would seem to be unrealistic and unreasonable to conclude that
such parties by agreement among themselves, could bind third
party suppliers of materials to the terms of an agreement to
which such suppliers were not privies and the terms of which
they do not know.").
Other jurisdictions which have considered this issue have
held that the owner consent required by a mechanics* lien
statute is merely authority to commence work on improvements.
Once the owner gives authority to his contractor agent to begin
work, secret limitations as to the price or nature of the work
are an ineffective defense against a mechanic's lien. For
example, in Vickerv v. Richardson. 189 Mass. 53, 75 N.E. 136
(Mass. 1905), the Massachusetts Supreme Court analyzed an
owner's defense to a mechanic's lien. The architect had been
given express limitations on the amount of money he was
authorized to spend for improvements. Contrary to these
express limitations, the architect engaged a contractor to
build for an amount in excess of the authorized limit. The
court upheld the contractor*s lien on the owner*s property,
stating:
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[I]t is claimed that this implied
authority/ although it empowered [the
architect] to make . . . contracts/ did
not confer any authority to bind the
[owner] to pay an increased price# as [the
architect] was limited to the amount
specified in the contract with [the
o w n e r ] . . . . The consent given, however,
JS to the performance Of the work, not to
the lien, or the amount for which, under
it, the interest of the owner in the land
can be charged.
Id. at 136 (emphasis added).
With these principles in mind/ we review the trial court's
refusal to foreclose Bailey's mechanic's lien. It is
undisputed that Bailey was unaware of any agreement between
Call and Gurule limiting Gurule's authority to purchase
materials. Accordingly, under the precedent previously
discussed/ even if the evidence supports the trial court's
finding that Gurule was to supply the materials from his own
inventory/ this limitation does not preclude foreclosure of
Bailey's mechanic's lien.
If/ as in Interiors Contracting Inc.. an express limitation
in a lease cannot protect a lessor/owner from lien liability,
it necessarily follows that a verbal understanding cannot limit
the lien liability of an owner against a materialman who, in
good faith/ supplied products to the contractor to benefit the
owner's property.
The trial court's legal conclusion that Gurule could not
bind Call as owner of the property is in error. Gurule was an
agent authorized to furnish materials to improve Call's
property/ under the mechanics' lien statute. Gurule purchased
$3/327.90 in materials from Bailey which directly benefited
Call's property/ and Bailey was not paid for these materials.
Bailey properly filed a mechanic's lien and is entitled to its
foreclosure. Call could not limit Gurule's authority to the
detriment of Bailey# a third party supplier not privy to
Gurule's and Call's original conversation. Call's consent and
authorization under.the mechanics' lien statute went to the
performance of the work, not to the source of the materials.
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We reverse the trial court and award Bailey $3,327.90 under
his mechanic's lien claim.2
ATTORNEY FEES
The second issue on appeal is the trial court's denial of
Bailey's claim for attorney fees. Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18
(1988) provides:
In any action brought to enforce any lien
under this chapter the successful party
shall be entitled to recover a reasonable
attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court,
which shall be taxed as costs in the
action.
Because of our decision allowing Bailey to foreclose his
mechanic's lien, we hold, he is entitled to a reasonable
attorney fee. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the
determination of a reasonable attorney fee under § 38-1-18.

Reversed and remanded.

Judith M. Billings, Judge
I CONCUR:

Norman H. Jackson^uudge
ORME, J. (concurring specially):
I agree with what is said in the main opinion about the
applicability of the mechanics' lien statute and Bailey's right
to foreclose his lien. I am troubled by the result, however, in
that the adjudged amount of Bailey's lien, $3,327.90, greatly
exceeds the amount Call agreed to pay Gurule for the
2. Based upon our conclusion that Bailey's mechanic's lien can
be foreclosed against Call, it is unnecessary to reach the
issues Bailey raises under the bond statute.
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materials.1 As Call had a deal to procure those materials
for much less, it strikes me as unfair to impose this full
amount on Call. Call had no knowledge of Bailey and no control
over him. Indeed, Call's contract with Gurule specifically
required Gurule to supply the materials himself, on favorable
terms. Nor do I see how Call could have done anything to
protect himself—short of calling all construction material
suppliers in the West and advising them of the fact Gurule had
no authority to purchase materials from them for use in Call's
project. As a matter of fairness, I think Bailey's lien should
be limited, aside from recoverable fees and costs, to the
amount Call contracted to pay for the materials.
Indeed, a number of reported cases have held that the
amount of a subcontractor's or supplier's lien is limited by
the amount owed on the contract between the owner and
contractor. See, e.g., Westinahouse Elec. Supply Co., Inc. v.
Electromech, Inc., 119 N.H. 833, 409 A.2d 1141, 1143 (1979);
Cashwav Lumber Co. v. Lanqston, 479 P.2d 582, 586 (Okla.
1970). T h i s limitation is demanded as a matter of simple
justice and expediency. The owner, having direct relation with
the contractor, knows what his liablity to him is. Having no
such relation with the subcontractor, he does not know what the
contractor's liability to the subcontractor is." Westinahouse
Electric, 409 A.2d at 1143 (quoting Boulia-Gorell Lumber v.
East Coast Realty Co., 84 N.H. 174, 148 A. 28, 31 (1929)).
-The purpose of limiting a subcontractor's lien, therefore, is
to protect the owner from unknown liability to the
subcontractor or materialman and from liability for payments in
excess of the amounts owed to the general contractor." 409
A.2d at 1144.
However, it must be conceded that these cases turn on
particular statutory provisions. Likewise, an old Utah case is
consistent with the notion that a supplier's or subcontractor's
lien may not exceed the amount the property owner contracted to
pay. See Sierra Nevada Lumber Co. v. Whitmore, 24 Utah 130, 66
P. 779, 781 (1901) ("subcontractor, by virtue of the original
contract, is entitled, under his subcontract, to a lien, within
the limit of the original contract price"). But Sierra also
turned, in relevant part, on a statutory provision which
appears to have been deleted at some point from the Utah Code
and is not in the present version of our mechanics' lien
1. That amount was $2,600 according to Call's uncontroverted
testimony. The findings prepared by Bailey's counsel
mistakenly recite a figure of $1,800.
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statute.2

See Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-1 to -26 (1988).

Unfortunately, in my view, the statutory scheme currently
in effect in Utah does not protect a property owner from
potentially paying more to a subcontractor or supplier than he
agreed to pay to his contractor. On the contrary, the property
owner is only protected to the extent that he cannot be liened
for more than the -value" of the materials. Utah Code Ann. §
38-1-3 (1988). Such protection is no doubt sufficient in the
routine case, but it is inadequate in a case like this one,
where a property owner contracts for materials at greatly
discounted prices and ends up being liable for the full value
of those materials through no fault of his own.

Gregoi^r K. Orme, Judge

2. The provision, Rev. Stat. § 1373, provided in part as
follows: wIn case of a contract between an owner and a
contractor, the lien shall extend to the entire price, and such
contract shall operate as a lien in favor of all persons except
the contractor to the extent of the whole contract price . . . «
Sierra, 66 P. at 781.
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE'DEPARTMENT
CLARON D. BAILEY,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.
WILLIAM G. CALL and GENE S.
CALL,

Civil No.

85-CV-10254

Defendants.
)

The foregoing matter, having cone on for trial before the
Honorable Michael Hutchings on the £S~

day of

fc£"+y

~*f / ^ f T ^ ^ j

1986, plaintiff being present and represented by counsel Steven F.
Alder, defendant William G. Call being present and represented by
counsel John w. Call.

The defendant Gene S. Call was served but

not present was represented by John VI. Call and bound by the
proceedings by stipulation of counsel.

The court having heard

evidence and argument of counsel;
NOW THEREFORE makes the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The defendants William G. Cell and Gene S. Call are the

owners of real property in Salt Lake County, State of Utah which
is described as follows:

*/ —

-2-

PARCEL NO. 1:
BEGINNING at the Southeast corner of Lot 4,
SOUTHGATE PARK SUBDIVISION and running thence
North 0 o 01 l West 134.29 feet to the point of
beginning, and running thence West 83 feet;
thence North 0°01 • East 31.55 feet; thence East
83 feet; thence South 21.55 feet to the point
of beginning.
PARCEL NO. 2:
BEGINNING at the Northeast corner of Lot 248,
SOUTHGATE PARK SUBDIVISION, and running thence
South 0 o 01 f West 71.8 feet; thence West 83
feet; thence North 0°1• East 71.8 feet; thence
East 83 feet to the point of beginning.
2.

The plaintiff is doing business in Salt Lake County as a

supplier of drywall materials.
3.

The subject matter of this action included the foreclosure

of a lien against the above-described property and therefore, this
court has proper jurisdiction of the subject matter of this
dispute.
4.

While the defendants were owners of the above-described

property, they entered into a contract with a Mr. Roy Gurule for
the construction of certain improvements upon the above-described
real property.

The improvements included:

a) the placement of sheetrock over damaged portions of
the ceiling;
b) the hanging of a suspended grid ceiling and the
placement of the ceiling tiles within the grid;
c)

the suspension and placement of fluorescent light

panels within the grids.

SiS
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5.

On or about the 26th of April, 1985, the plaintiff v;as

contacted by Mr. Roy Gurule and agreed to sell to Mr. Roy Gurule
certain materials, including the following:

6.

a)

sheetrock

b)

sheetrock mud

c)

suspended ceiling grid and tiles

d)

lighting panels.

The materials purchased by Mr. Roy Gurule from the

plaintiff were identified by Mr.Gurule or his agents as being
purchased for the improvement of the defendants1 property.
7.

The agreement between the plaintiff and Mr. Gurule

provided that the plaintiff would receive payment for these
materials within thirty days of delivery.
8.

The plaintiff pursuant to said agreement did provide

materials to Mr. Roy Gurule which were delivered to the
defendant's address or picked up by Mr. Gurule from the plaintiff.
9.

All materials purchased except some items returned for

credit were installed in the real property owned by the
defendants.
10.

Materials were supplied commencing on the 26th day of

April, 1985 and continuing until the 21st day of May, 1985.
11.

The reasonable and fair market value of the materials

sold to Mr. Gurule and installed as improvements to the real
property less credits for items returned was the sum of $3,327.00.
12.

Mr. Roy Gurule failed to make payments on his account to

the plaintiff despite demands by the plaintiff that he do so.
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13.

Plaintiff made demand for payment upon the defendants and

the defendants have failed to make payment to the plaintiff
against the amount ov;ing for materials purchased,
14.

On June 7, 1985, the plaintiff caused to be recorded a

Notice of Lien against the above-described real property as Entry
No. 4096078 at Book 5661 , Page 575, at the offices of the Salt
Lake County Recorder.
15.

Said Notice of Lien was filed in compliance with the

provisions and requirements of §38-1-7 et seq. U.C.A. as amended.
16.

A copy of said Notice'of Lien was mailed by certified

mail to the defendants William G. Call and Gene S. Call at 2157
East 7050 Southf Salt Lake City, Utah within thirty days of the
recording of the lien.
17.

The lien was properly signed and notarized and otherwise

complied in form with the statutory requirements to claim a lien
for improvements to real property.

The lien was not compromised

or satisfied and no other action was pending to foreclose said
lien against the real property.

The plaintiff retained counsel

for purposes of bringing this action and foreclosing its lien
rights against the real property.
18.

The contractors son, together with the contractor, did

provide services at the defendants' property specifically as
follows:

the contractorfs son placed sheetrock over damagedarea

in the roof of the building and the contractor assisted in the
loading and stacking of materials at the defendants' building.

~70
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19.

The materials supplied by the plaintiff to the

defendants' building were either picked up by the contractor from
the plaintiff's business or were delivered to the defendants'
property by a third party supplier.
20.

The contractor identified the materials purchased as

being for the defendants' business property and invoices were
marked with that identification.
21.

All charges by the contractor (Gurule) for the job so

identified were separately accounted for by the plaintiff.
22.

The contractor, Roy Gurule, at the time of the initial

agreement with the defendants verbally represented to the
defendant William Call that he was a very large contractor and
could obtain the materials for improvements at a low cost because
of the large volume of his construction activities.
23.

The defendant William Call reasonably implied from the

foregoing representations that the contractor would obtain the
materials from his own stock or his own warehouse and v/ould not be
purchasing them from a third party.

The defendant did not know \

that the plaintiff had supplied the subject materials until after I
they had been supplied and the work completed.

I

The plaintiff was not notified by the defendant or the ^
or t>y
contractor either verbally or in writing/the actions of either
24.

party that the defendant had represented to the owner that he had
not purchased these materials but had them in his own stock.
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25.

The defendants never contacted the plaintiff prior to

thesupplying of materials nor did the plaintiff contact the
defendants prior to the time that materials had been supplied to

\

•

\4

the property, although the plaintiff had knovm the defendants were \ \|
the recipients of the supplies and knew the address where such
supplies were delivered.
26.

The defendants William G. Call and Gene S. Call failed to

provide a bond for the improvements as required by §14-2-1 et seq.
U.C.A. as amended.
27.

The value of the improvements exceeded $2,000.00.

28.

The contractor represented to the defendants that he

would provide the materials and improvements for a total price of
$1,800.00.

Said amount was the agreed price between the

defendants and their contractor Roy Gurule for the materials and
labor supplied.
29.

Contractor further agreed with the defendants to accept a

reupholstering of certain furniture as partial payment for the
materials.

This couch was later sold by the defendant to cover

the costs of recoverying it.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAU
1.

The plaintiff properly filed its Noticeof Lien in

conformance with the requirements of Utah Code §38-1-7 et seq. as

~7<D
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amended and properly gave notice by certified mail to the
defendants within thirty days of the filing thereof.
2.

The authority of defendants contractor was verbally

limited so as to preclude the defendant from obtaining materials
from outside of his own warehouse.

As a result of such verbal

limitation, the contractor was without authority to act as the
owner's agent in purchasing materials for improvements to
defendants * property.
3.

By virtue of the defendants' lack of agency with the owner

because of the verbal limitation on the agency of the contractor,
the defendants are not entitled to foreclose their lien and are
precluded from recovering attorney's fees in this action as
related to the lien foreclosure.
4.

The reasonable value of all labor and materials delivered

to the defendants' property and installed as improvements upon the
property less all proper offsets and credits is the sum of
$3,327.90 plus interest.
5.

The defendants failed to obtain a bond as required by the

provisions of §14-2-1 et seq. U.C.A. as amended.

The provisions

of Paragraph 2.2 provide that any persons subject to the
provisions of the chapter who shall fail to obtain a good and
sufficient bond or to exhibit the same as herein required shall be
personally liable to all persons who have furnished materials or
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performed labor under the contract for the reasonable value of
such materials furnished or labor performed, not exceeding however
in any case the price agreed upon.
6.

The contract between the defendants and the contractor

called for the contractor to supply labor and materials in the sum
of $1,800.00. The verbal contract

between

the defendants and the

contractor called for the contractor's supply of labor and
materials in the sum of $1800, although the contract between the
contractor and his supplier called for a purchase price of S3,327.
7.

By failure of the defendants to obtain a bond for the

<E

improvements, they are liable/for the value of said improvements
not to exceed the amount of the contract price betv/een themselves
and their contractor; to wit, $1,800.00 plus interest.
8.

The plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the

defendants in the sum of $1,800.00, together with its costs and
interest from the date the materials were supplied until date of
judgment at 10% per annum and from the date of judgment until paid
at 12% per annum.
DATED this

^ / day of

f\

(

1Kl\/j\/WJ\

$7<jL

, . ::V^r•' , 1987.
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Approved by:

W. Call
rney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the £«?>*, day of
3tfvrs«*^/
rrect copy
CODV of the foregoing FIftD
1986, I mailed a true and correct
FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to John W. Call, Attorney for
Defendants, Henriksen, Henriksen & Call, 320 South 500 East,
S.L.C., UT 84102.

Vfo?7«^777/Sf/5•^xe/atA^..

275

